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I.

INTRODUCTION

The explosion in tort liability claims and awards in the mid1980s led many observers to conclude that the nation was undergoing a liability crisis. The perception that liability costs were becoming both uncertain and excessively high, in turn, generated the
impetus for a series of reform efforts, as a large number of states
enacted measures to reduce liability costs. These policies consisted
of a variety of damage caps, as well as reforms of doctrines such as
joint and several liability.1
The pharmaceutical industry played a particularly prominent
role in the liability reform debate. Although much of the surge in
tort liability can be accounted for by asbestos cases, which made up
the majority of all federal liability cases beginning in 1987,2 the
pharmaceutical industry was a prominent player in the tort liability
arena as well. For example, G.D. Searle and Company suspended
production of the Copper-7 contraceptive device after spending
$1.5 million to defend itself against four lawsuits filed in a single
year.3 Similarly, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals was forced to dist This Article was delivered at the Symposium on The U.S. Pharmaceutical
Industry in the 1990s: Facing Health Care Reform, Regulation, andJudicial Controls,
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I For example, three states enacted general liability reforms with damages caps in
1985, nine states did so in 1986, and sixteen states followed suit in 1987. The number

of medical malpractice reforms was somewhat sparser, as four states enacted damages
caps in 1985, eight states did so in 1986, and one state adopted such a cap in 1987. A
breakdown of the states enacting caps and a summary of the type of reform appears in
W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of Liability Reform (1993) (Duke University Working Paper) (on file with author).
2 See W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 21 (1991)
3 See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 66.
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continue the production of Bendectin, the only prescription drug
that the Food and Drug Administration had approved for treating
morning sickness during pregnancy. This occured after Merrell
Dow had incurred legal expenses almost equal to the annual sales
of the product before ever having lost a case.4 The litigation over
the Dalkon Shield produced by A.H. Robins involved 195,000
claimants, leading the company to establish a trust fund of almost
$3 billion (as of 1989) to pay these claimants.5 A National Academy of Science panel concluded that the net effect of the surge in
liability costs had been to discourage innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly with respect to contraceptives.6
The purpose of this paper is to move beyond anecdotal evidence regarding the pharmaceutical industry by answering a
number of questions: What is the scale of litigation involving pharmaceutical products? How has the pace of litigation been affected
by the enactment of a variety of tort liability reform measures from
1985 to 1987? Finally, what is the relationship between the patterns exhibited by the pharmaceutical industry as compared to the
rest of the economy? Has the pharmaceutical industry been particularly hard hit, or is the rise in enterprise liability more broadly
based?
To resolve these issues, we will utilize data on federal product
liability cases compiled by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, in particular the computerized version of this data
set. These data only pertain to cases in the federal courts, not to
state court actions or out-of-court settlements. However, available
evidence suggests that patterns in state courts are roughly similar
in character so that examining the performance of federal litigation should nevertheless be instructive. 7 In addition, changes in
the plaintiff success rate will have some implications for the role of
out-of-court settlements.
For purposes of the study conducted, we divided companies
into two groups, those that produced pharmaceutical products and
other manufacturing firms. Companies that produced asbestos
were excluded from the sample so that the litigation patterns
Company Stops Making Morning Sickness Drug, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1983, at A16.
5 See ViscusI, supra note 2, at 168-69.
6 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DEVELOPING NEW CONTRACEPTIVES: OBSTACLES
4

AND OPPORTUNITIES (1990).
7 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILrMn'
EXTENSIVE 'LITIGATION
EXPLOSION' IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED (1988) and GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY- VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTIONS IN FIVE STATES (Report

HRD-89-99) (1989).
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would not be overwhelmed by the surge in asbestos-related claims.
The sample, which extended from 1976 to 1989, included eighteen
pharmaceutical companies and 438 other manufacturing companies.8 Liability patterns are tracked for these companies over the
thirteen year period, so that this represents an extensive data base
on the role of product liability lawsuits by industry. This analysis
represents the first effort of its kind to distinguish federal court
trends on an industry basis.9
The pattern of litigation that we will identify is quite striking.
The statistics support the perception that there was a surge in pharmaceutical industry litigation that peaked in 1985. This litigation
abated in the subsequent years, but the decline may not be a cause
for complacency because of the greater role assumed by out-ofcourt settlements.
II.

LITIGATION PATTERNS

Figure 1 presents the trends in the total number of product
liability cases filed each year in federal courts for the pharmaceutical industry and for the rest of the manufacturing sector. To put
these statistics in perspective, note that the relative share of the
pharmaceutical industry in the entire manufacturing sector of the
economy is not great. In the last year of the sample, 1989, the
manufacturing sector excluding pharmaceuticals was four times as
large as the pharmaceutical industry, where the measure used is
the dollar value of shipments. 10
Notwithstanding the substantial discrepancy in the size of the
pharmaceutical industry and the rest of the manufacturing sector,
the number of suits filed is roughly comparable in each case. Indeed, in 1985, pharmaceutical industry cases were almost twice as
numerous as those instituted against the rest of the manufacturing
8 This matching process was undertaken by the authors based on judgments regarding the principal industry in which the firm operated. Industry codes are not
included in the original data base, but corporate names are.
The following were the pharmaceutical companies included in the sample: A.H.
Robins Co., Abbott Laboratories, Allergan Inc., Alza Corporation, American Home
Products, American Cyanamid, Bristol Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly & Co., Glaxo Holdings
PLC, Johnson & Johnson, Marion Merrell Dow Inc., Merck & Co., Pfizer Inc., Schering-Plough, Smithkline Beecham PLC, Syntex Corp., Upjohn Co., and Warner-Lambert Co.
9 The only possible exception is that of asbestos, which is broken out separately in
the federal court data.
10 In particular, the dollar value of shipments in the pharmaceutical industry was
$46.8 billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLooK 50-2
(1990). The total shipments of the manufacturing sector overall were $232.7 billion
in 1989. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 409 (1993).
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sector, excluding asbestos. The surge in pharmaceutical industry
liability in 1985 is attributable largely to mass lawsuits against two
companies. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the producer of
Bendectin, accounted for 1,319 cases in 1985, and A.H. Robins, the
producer of the Copper-7, accounted for 1,185 cases. The decline
in the number of cases filed against Merrell Dow to 140 in 1986
and the similar drop of A.H. Robins cases filed to 302 in that year
accounts for the stark decline in pharmaceutical industry cases in
1986.
Although companies incur litigation costs irrespective of
whether they win the cases, the outcome is pertinent in that it affects whether there is an award to the plaintiff. If the awards are
large, they provide financial incentives for others to file claims with
the hope of obtaining similar renumeration. The fraction of product liability cases won by plaintiffs is illustrated in Figure 2.
If the stakes of the plaintiff and defendant are even in all cases
and the situation is otherwise symmetric, some legal scholars have
hypothesized that there should be a fifty-fifty split in court verdicts
between plaintiffs and defendants. 1 The reasoning is that any differences that favor one party over another will be anticipated during the settlement process. The parties will consequently
incorporate effects, such as pro-plaintiff leanings in a particular jurisdiction, into their settlement efforts. The cases that are litigated
will consequently be a random mix of cases that emerge once this
case selection process has occurred.
Evidence for the 1970s suggested that this fifty-fifty split did
12
not hold, as defendants won a greater proportion of the cases.
Such a situation would arise if the stakes for the two sets of parties
were not identical. In particular, if manufacturers had a larger
stake in the outcome than plaintiffs, one would predict that the
pattern of settlements would generate a mix of cases in the courts
in which defendants won more often than did plaintiffs. 3 Such an
inequality would arise, for example, if a company's loss in a case
had broad ramifications for an entire pattern of litigation against
the product. In such a situation, the company's expected loss (i.e.,
probability of losing multiplied by the size of the loss) may exceed
the expected court award to that particular plaintiff. To avoid high
S1ISee George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
12 See generally Viscusi,

supra note 2, at 42-61.
See W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinantsof the Disposition of ProductLiability Claims and
Compensationfor Bodily Injury, 15J. LEGAL STUn. 321 (1986).
13
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litigation costs and pattern-setting outcomes, the company may be
willing to offer the plaintiff a larger amount to settle the case than
the company expects to lose based on the court verdict alone and
its chance of losing, even if the company has a very good chance of
winning the case. It is noteworthy, for example, that producers of
breast implants established a compensation fund in 1993 at the
early stage of the litigation, whereas such measures were undertaken at a much later stage for asbestos and the Dalkon Shield.
The persistent plaintiff success rate of less than fifty percent from
1978 to 1979 illustrated in Figure 2 is consistent with this view that
14
the stakes are not symmetric.
There is, however, an alternative hypothesis that the absence
of a fifty-fifty split in the cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s was
a short-run phenomenon, as the courts had not fully adjusted to
the advent of strict liability and other changes in liability doctrine.
The patterns in Figure 2 suggest, however, that the defendant success rate in excess of fifty percent was not an aberration, but in fact
remained fairly steady and even increased through the latter part
of that decade.
Significantly, the pharmaceutical industry's performance improved considerably after 1986. Whereas it lost over thirty percent
of the cases in 1986, by 1989 it was losing fewer than ten percent.
In contrast, the manufacturing sector experienced a steady rise in
the fraction of cases won by plaintiffs.
One should, however, be cautious in interpreting these statistics as providing evidence in favor of shifts in liability criteria applied in the courts because these data pertain to the mix of cases
litigated. Companies and plaintiffs should presumably take into account changes in liability laws that affect their prospects in court.
Changes in the patterns of out-of-court settlements will alter the
mix of cases litigated and the success rate pattern for cases taken to
verdict. An open issue is the speed with which the parties adapted.
The mid-1980s witnessed an explosion of cases and the enactment
of many liability reforms. Did the explosion in litigation costs lead
companies to settle more cases? Or did the high plaintiff awards in
the mid-1980s raise expectations so that cases with little chance of
success were filed? A final possibility is that parties were slow to
react to the liability reform changes. The apparent persistence of a
low plaintiff success rate suggests that the effect of the changing
14 Other interpretations are possible as well. For example, one might claim that
the case selection models simply do not hold.
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litigation stakes on out-of-court setdements may be most
influential.
The rise in the plaintiff success rate for manufacturing in the
late 1980s is not surprising because it appears to have been aberrantly low in 1984. What is more surprising is that the plaintiff
success rates for manufacturing and pharmaceuticals move in opposite directions from 1986 to 1989. One possible explanation is
that the rise of mass toxic torts for pharmaceuticals that became so
pronounced in 1986 had so raised the stakes for pharmaceutical
firms that companies became increasingly willing to settle out of
court. The only cases remaining to be litigated were those in which
plaintiffs had litde chance of success.
The shift in plaintiff success rates is reflected in the number of
cases leading to an award (Figure 3), where these statistics reflect
the compound influence of the number of cases resolved and the
plaintiff success rate. These patterns are somewhat different than
those in Figure 2. Whereas plaintiff success rates were relatively
steady through 1984 and declined thereafter, the number of cases
leading to plaintiff awards displays an inverted V-shaped pattern.
Both pharmaceuticals and manufacturing display the same general
pattern, but the starkness of the increase through 1985 and the
decline thereafter is greater for pharmaceuticals. Plaintiff awards
against other manufacturing industries do not change substantially
between 1980 and 1988, with the exception of the peak award
years, 1983 and 1984.
An intriguing feature is that the peak in the number of cases
leading to awards occurred in 1985 for the pharmaceutical industry, but in that year the fraction of cases won by plaintiffs had plummeted to its lowest level in the period from 1978 to 1989. The
volume of cases and the plaintiff success rate moved in opposite
directions during that time.
III.

LIABILITY AwARDs

The economic impact of liability suits depends not only on the
number of cases and the fraction of cases won by the plaintiff but
also on the magnitude of the award. Figure 4 presents information
on the mean level of an award, given that an award was made, and
Figure 5 presents evidence with respect to the median award.
These statistics do not adjust for subsequent reversals of cases or
reductions of award levels after appeal. Consequently, they will
tend to overstate the total level of awards ultimately paid. The
mean award level reflects the average award that is made, but this
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statistic may be influenced by extreme outliers, whereas the median award level is less susceptible to such impacts.
In each case, the patterns that are exhibited are quite striking.
In 1985 and 1986, the average pharmaceutical award greatly exceeded that of manufacturing, and in 1984 the awards were
roughly comparable. During the peak years of the liability cost explosion, it was pharmaceutical firms, rather than the rest of manufacturing, that accounted for the major awards. In the low award
years, from 1987 to 1989, the pattern was reversed as the average
manufacturing award exceeded that for pharmaceuticals.
The extreme fluctuation in the patterns of pharmaceutical industry awards during those years is due to the clustering of key
mass tort outcomes. For example, in 1984 A.H. Robins lost fourteen cases with average awards of $4.1 million. The 1986 awards
were greatly affected by eleven cases lost by Merrell Dow with average verdicts of $7.1 million. Similar clustering of cases accounted
for the manufacturing award rise in 1984, as Ford lost eight cases
with average awards of $11.0 million, General Motors lost nine
cases with average awards of $10.5 million, and Chrysler lost four
cases with average awards of $9.6 million.
The contrast between pharmaceuticals and manufacturing is
even more dramatic for the median award levels illustrated in Figure 5. Usually, one would expect medians of such distributions to
be more compressed than means, which may be more influenced
by big award outliers. In this instance, the opposite is the case as
the median awards reveal an even starker explosion of award levels
over 1984 to 1986. The median pharmaceutical industry award was
$4.1 million in 1984, $10.4 million in 1985, and $7.1 million in
1986. These awards dwarf the median award levels for manufacturing, particularly in 1985 and 1986. Indeed, the three extreme median award outliers over the 1976 to 1989 period are the
pharmaceutical industry awards in the critical mid-1980s liability
crisis years.
Largely because of the greater size of the manufacturing sector (excluding pharmaceuticals) relative to the pharmaceutical industry, total liability awards in federal courts are greater for
manufacturing than for pharmaceuticals, except in 1985, as is
shown in Figure 6. The years 1982 to 1986 mark the principal time
period in which awards were at an extremely high level. Manufacturing liability awards surged to over $300 million in 1984, and in
1985 the pharmaceutical industry award level broke the $100 million level and exceeded that for the rest of the manufacturing sec-
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tor. In 1987 and thereafter, awards plummeted, particularly for
pharmaceutical companies.
IV.

LIABILITY AwARDs IN THE CONTEXT OF FiRM OPERATIONS

The relative magnitude of liability awards for the pharmaceutical industry as compared with manufacturing more generally is
best exemplified by the value of federal product liability awards relative to sales, which is illustrated in Figure 7. With the exception of
1979 and 1989, two years in which liability awards were very low,
pharmaceutical industry liability awards outdistanced those in manufacturing relative to sales. Perhaps most importantly, during the
peak years of liability awards, from 1982 to 1986, the differences
were enormous. In 1982, pharmaceutical industry liability awards
relative to sales were three times as great as in manufacturing; by
1986 this differential had risen to a factor of ten. Even in 1987,
when liability awards had abated, awards relative to sales were five
times as great in pharmaceuticals.
Although it is clear from these results that pharmaceuticals
have been differentially hard hit by liability awards, the magnitude
of the awards may not seem to be great. Awards as a percentage of
sales reached a peak of .05 percent in 1986 for pharmaceuticals.
Awards as a share of profits are, of course, much greater. These
statistics, however, understate the full impact of liability costs. The
awards discussed only capture verdicts in federal courts, not awards
resulting from state court actions. Moreover, because ninety-five
percent of all liability claims that are not dropped are settled out of
court rather than taken to a court verdict,' 5 even if we had data on
award levels for all courts-both state and federal-that data would
capture only a minority of all payouts for liability. Addtionally,
none of these award statistics reflects the role of litigation costs and
changes in product design in response to the liability system.
Thus, the award levels and the various statistics that have been calculated can best be viewed as an index of the relative trend in federal liability costs rather than as a measure of the absolute cost
impact.
It has often been hypothesized that liability awards may depress research and development (R&D) because they discourage
innovation in new products with unproven designs. 6 These risks
15 See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 48.

16 A statistical analysis of these linkages appears in W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J.
Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation, 101 J. POL. ECON.
161 (1993); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, An IndustrialProfile of the Link between
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have been particularly highlighted in the case of many pharmaceutical products, such as those relating to contraception and pregnancy. The countervailing incentive effect is that greater liability
awards may stimulate innovation in safety-related product features
in an effort to decrease subsequent liability awards.
Although the trends in R&D expenditures relative to sales as
illustrated in Figure 8 are not conclusive with respect to these different hypotheses, they do nevertheless present some intriguing
patterns. 17 Perhaps most striking is the different level of the value
of R&D expenditures relative to sales. Throughout the time period
examined, the pharmaceutical industry has consistently undertaken roughly three times as much R&D relative to sales as the rest
of the manufacturing industry. The very high liability costs of the
pharmaceutical industry are coupled with extremely high R&D
levels, a combination that has led many observers to link the uncertainties associated with product innovation to high liability costs.
The causality is, however, two directional. Although liability awards
may be greatest for innovative firms, liability also affects innovation
by encouraging safety innovation and discouraging risky product
innovations.
The overall trend in R&D relative to sales for pharmaceuticals
has remained relatively steady, except for a brief dip in 1986,
whereas there has been more of a plateau for manufacturing R&D
since 1986. Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish the character of the R&D expenditures. To what extent are these expenditures defensive expenditures intended to mute the liability burden,
as opposed to expenditures that are on the frontier of developing
new and innovative products? The available data do not enable us
to distinguish between these two hypotheses.
V.

CONCLUSION

Examination of the liability statistics for the federal courts is
instructive for several reasons. First, these data confirm what many
ProductLiability and Innovation, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAw
ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); and W.
Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between ProductLiability
and Innovation, in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:

COMPETITION, INNOVATION,

AND CONSUMER WELFARE (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
For a more general discussion of these linkages see PETER W. HUBER, LIABILrrY.
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).

17 The data on R&D expenditures and sales are from the Compustat data base.
This computerized data base provides information by firm and by year, which was
matched to the firms in the federal court product liability sample.
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believed based on the widespread anecdotal reports regarding liability costs. The pharmaceutical industry, which is one of the most
innovative industries in the economy, has been particularly hard
hit by the surge in liability costs. The level of the awards borne by
the industry, as well as the litigation rate more generally, are at a
higher rate than for the rest of the manufacturing sector. This
view is consistent with the hypothesis that tort liability costs fall disproportionately on the developers of new products with uncertain
attributes as opposed to industries that have products whose designs change very little and are not much affected by product
innovation.
The two most remarkable aspects about the patterns in these
figures were the explosion of liability costs in the mid-1980s and
the dramatic decline in the late 1980s. More specifically, in the
years 1982 to 1986 there was a surge in the rate of liability claims
and in award levels. Beginning in 1987, however, awards plummeted, as did litigation levels.
There are a number of possible explanations for this stark
turnaround. One possibility is that the litigation environment
changed after the enactment of liability reform measures in a large
number of states, primarily in 1986 and 1987. These efforts imposed a variety of types of damages caps and other restrictions on
liability.
There is little question that the imposition of constraints on
awards and other pro-defendant changes in the liability regime will
reduce liability costs. However, the patterns observed in the federal courts are quite pronounced, far beyond what even the most
ardent proponent of liability reform may have expected. Recent
research analyzing the specific effect of liability reforms on general
liability insurance and medical malpractice insurance suggests that
these measures did have a significant role in limiting liability
costs. 18 Damage cap reforms appear to have been particularly influential. However, the effect on liability insurance costs is not as
dramatic as the stark shifts in Federal litigation patterns in the late
1980s, which suggest that other aspects of the liability regime may
be influential as well.
A second possibility is that companies adjusted to the shift in
the liability climate and settled more cases out of court so that the
mix of cases that were litigated changed. The establishment of
trust funds for asbestos litigation and the Dalkon Shield, for exam18 See Viscusi & Born, supra note 1.
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ple, established the administrative compensation approach as an
alternative to litigation. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986 similarly served to remove many vaccine death-related
cases from the courts as well.
Perhaps the most telling statistic with respect to the factors
driving the changing pattern of litigation is the dramatic drop in
the plaintiff success rate in pharmaceutical industry cases between
1986 and 1989. Whereas plaintiffs won one-third of all cases in
1986, by 1988 and 1989 plaintiffs were winning fewer than ten percent. Such changes cannot be explained solely by a liability regime
shift. Most of these reforms focused on damage limits rather than
liability rules. Moreover, if liability laws were structured in a manner that increased the advantage of defendants relative to plaintiffs, then we would expect the mix of cases settled out of court to
adjust, and the plaintiff success rate to remain unchanged. Reactions by plaintiffs and defendants to the new regime will consequently eliminate any effect on the observed plaintiff success rate
as parties will anticipate the effect of the tort reform laws on outcomes and adjust settlement behavior accordingly.
What can explain this precipitous drop in plaintiff success
rates is a change in out-of-court settlement patterns. There was an
escalation in the cost of losing cases for defendants, relative to the
stakes facing plaintiffs, due to the rise of mass torts involving entire
pharmaceutical product lines in which pattern-setting liability
awards had broad ramifications. Faced with such large stakes, companies became increasingly willing to settle cases out of court.
Many marginal cases, and even cases in which the company has a
better than even chance of winning, become attractive to settle
once the stakes for the company are sufficiently large. The litigation patterns are consequently consistent with a situation in which
fewer cases reach the federal courts because of a rise in out-ofcourt settlements.
As a result, one should be cautious in interpreting the federal
court statistics. Although these data indicate an abatement of litigation rates and award levels in federal courts, they do not necessarily imply that the overall liability burden has abated to the same
degree. The data are also strongly consistent with the possibility
that out-of-court settlements have risen as well. Data based on the
federal courts may induce a false sense of complacency. What we
observe in the federal courts may not be representative of the liability system as a whole.

